November 29, 1954

REVIEW OF U.S. POLICY ON CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS

(Report by State Working Group)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This Report is prepared in response to a request of the National Security Council for a review of U.S. policy with respect to disarmament, as set forth in NSC 112. For this purpose, the NSC set up an Ad Hoc Committee, composed of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

2. Reports have been prepared by working groups within the Departments of State and Defense. A technical study on the nuclear aspects of the problem has been prepared by the staff of the Atomic Energy Commission. Both the State and Defense reports have taken account of the AEC report, but do not agree on the analysis of the problem or on their conclusions. Accordingly, separate reports are being submitted by each of the two working groups.

3. This report seeks to answer the following questions:

a. What basic criteria should the U.S. apply in establishing its position on disarmament?

b. In what ways is our present position set forth in NSC 112 outmoded?

c. What are the principles which should govern a new position adapted to current and prospective situation?

d. What provisions should be included in a plan based on these principles?

4. This report (a) concludes that a program for progressive control of armaments is feasible and in the U.S. interest, and (b) outlines the basic provisions of such a program.

II. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

A. Risks in a Continuation of Present Trends

5. Present military trends entail serious risks for the U.S.:

a. By 1957-59, the Soviet Union will achieve effective atomic parity with the U.S.:--that is, the capacity, despite our superiority in stockpiles and weapons systems, to damage the U.S. so severely that it could not hope to achieve any rational political end from the war. The NSC (5422, August 7, 1954) has recognized that such a nuclear war could destroy civilization.

b. As effective atomic parity is approached, the margin of advantage which the U.S. has over the Soviet Union will diminish. The Soviet Union may have certain

political and psychological advantages for getting away the crucial first strike in nuclear war. The principal asset of the U.S. in war and its most effective means for deterring war in the past has been the existence of its relatively secure industrial potential. After 1957-59, this advantage could be wiped out by a nation which, although relatively weaker in nuclear weapons, could strike first.

c. Although the U.S. may stay ahead of the Soviet Union indefinitely, the adversary will have a wide range of growing means, including a larger manpower pool, an industrial plant which will outweigh that of Western Europe, a strategic position based on interior lines and an atomic capability which, while secondary, may yet be sufficient for a crippling blow.

d. The growing power of the Soviet bloc and the intolerable nature of nuclear war tend to weaken the effectiveness of the Alliance system, on which the U.S. still largely depends, and to freeze the uncommitted peoples into attitudes of neutrality. The pressure of uneasy public opinion on governments could threaten the availability of bases to us in wartime and the buildup of local forces.

6. Our present policies recognize that the awesome prospect of nuclear war tends to create a condition of "mutual deterrence" in which each side will hesitate to strike the other for fear of the consequences. But current trends do not necessarily ensure a durable peace or continued security:

a. As military forces increasingly rely on use of nuclear weapons in all forms, any war entails the risk of developing into total nuclear war.

b. Under these conditions the U.S. may well hesitate to accept the risk of protecting areas which are not absolutely vital to it but whose sacrifice would lead to a piecemeal reduction of the free world.

c. The condition of "mutual deterrence" under present conditions is the product of haphazard checks and balances, not subject to exact calculation or verification. An aggressor may be impelled to launch a nuclear strike (1) by misjudging his prospects for "getting away with it"; and (2) through fear that he was about to become the victim of such an attack. It seems unduly optimistic to assume that such an unstable situation may not sooner or later produce full-scale war.

d. As international tensions increase and national atomic stockpiles grow, the necessary emphasis on military strength may make the free world more vulnerable to Soviet subversive and divisive methods. The inevitable focus on military

military matters may result in neglect of the economic and political measures essential for the long-term strength of the free world and its capacity to resist Soviet cold war tactics.

B. The Risks of Disarmament

7. Given the basic hostility of the Communists to the United States and the international habits of the Communists, the US must assume Communist bad faith in carrying out its agreements. A disarmament plan, therefore, cannot be based on mutual trust. In devising an acceptable plan for reduction of armaments, it is essential to ensure that the US (a) can acquire, through experience, sufficient assurance that the plan is actually operating to its benefit to continue with the plan; or (b) if convinced of a Communist violation, can abandon the plan without having impaired US security.

8. Central to any control plan is an effective system of inspection and verification. Experience in this field is limited and we must assume efforts to evade and mislead, as well as some technical difficulties. Even the best system of inspection would not provide complete security. It is important, therefore, that the disarmament plan should not assume unobtainable standards for inspection. As a minimum, however, the inspection system should provide more security than presently exists, through its ability to give adequate warning of violations and evasions.

9. In view of possible bad faith, the control plan must recognize the risk of violations and evasions. These might conceivably be handled in two ways:

(a) In the event of a violation, the other participants can rely on their own capabilities, either separately or jointly, to punish the violation, or to preserve their security. The international agency would be charged mainly with detecting violations by inspection and declaring them if found. This approach depends largely on (1) the timing of the rate of reduction in armaments so that it would be in phase with the demonstrated reliability over a period of time of the agency and the inspection system in applying the plan, and (2) provisions for releasing other participants, in case of major violation, from the restrictions of the plan to enable them to take immediate measures in self-defense.

(b) An international agency can be created with the power and forces necessary to deal directly with any major violation. Under existing conditions the chances of achieving this seem remote. Its acceptance would require major changes in the thinking of the U.S. as well as the U.S.S.R. Yet history would suggest that some such method may be necessary to achieve enforced peace and to escape a hydrogen holocaust.

It may

It may be possible to devise a plan which relies on the national safeguards in its early phases but which could become an "enforced" system later if conditions allow.

10. There is an inherent danger that public opinion may place more faith in a disarmament agreement than is warranted by the realities of international existence. The plan should not be presented in such a way as to create a false illusion of security. It must be justified principally on a showing that it offers at least more security than exists in the present situation. A US public position in favor of reduction of

armaments

armaments will, however, be of major assistance in retaining the cooperation of the allies of the US and in gaining the friendship and cooperation of the uncommitted areas of the world.

C. The Risks Compared

11. Our national future will be attended by risk whether we advance a new proposal for disarmament or whether we continue the present arms race. Whether any particular plan for reduction is acceptable depends on comparing the risks involved in the plan with those involved in allowing present trends to continue unaltered. If the risks involved in a reduction of armaments appear to be materially less than those potentially involved in present trends they should be judged to be acceptable. In making this judgment, it is essential to recognize that the magnitude of the risks involved in no disarmament is apparently destined to increase steadily from now on.



II. The UN Plan Outmoded

12. The UN plans for the international control of atomic energy and for reduction of conventional armaments bear the marks of the date of their origin. They were framed in a situation in which the US had the monopoly of atomic power; and have since been modified piecemeal to meet the new situation of a growing Soviet capability without a basic review of the concept.

13. Technological

13. Technological advances have now rendered obsolete or unnecessary some of the key provisions of the UN Plan. Both the US and USSR have now been producing nuclear materials over a substantial period and have accumulated inventories of nuclear fuels in militarily significant quantities. At the same time a far larger yield can be obtained from a given amount of nuclear fuel. In view of the facility with which such material could be secreted, the UN Plan does not provide any technical means which can fully account for all of this past production. For this reason effective control of atomic weapons would have to provide reliable means for detecting or neutralizing the potential amounts which could be secreted. (See Annex_____ by Atomic Energy Commission).

14. A central feature of the UN Plan was the ownership and operation of production facilities by the control agency. In view of the expansion of facilities for production, it would be far more difficult today to apply this concept of control. The growth of inventories of nuclear fuel has, however, removed the necessity for resorting to this solution for at least a long period. In view of the estimates as to the period required for developing large-scale economic use of nuclear fuels for power, the present stocks will be fully adequate to provide the requisite fuel for well over a decade. Consequently, it is not necessary to provide for continued operation of existing facilities to furnish fuel for

power, a contingency around which the UN Plan was largely oriented. Thus the possibility of closing down the greater part of existing producing facilities tends to make it less difficult to develop a control plan.

15. As other nations become aware of the inadequacy of the UN Plan, there is a danger that they may seek alternative solutions not necessarily in our security interests. It is to our interest, therefore, that our fresh survey be undertaken promptly, and, as soon as possible, in cooperation with our allies.

III. ELEMENTS OF A DISARMAMENT PLAN

A. Interrelation of inspection with the scope and pace of reduction of military capabilities.

16. An acceptable disarmament program depends upon two interrelated elements:

(a) Establishment of an inspection system adequate to reduce the risk of secret violations of the program to tolerable proportions;

(b) Establishment of a system for reducing the level of military capabilities at a pace which will not seriously jeopardize the security of the parties if a secret violation of the program is later discovered.

17. The interrelationship of these two elements stems from the fact (a) that the difficulty of establishing an inspection system varies in accordance with the scope of what

what it is to inspect; (b) that the degree of reliance which must be put on the inspection system varies in accordance with the extent and rate of the reduction of military capabilities; and (c) that the effectiveness of the inspection system may improve with experience in its operation over a period of time.

B. Varying Degrees of Difficulty of Inspection.

18. The difficulty of implementing an inspection system will vary in direct proportion to the size and complexity of the task it is called upon to perform.

a. Inspections to detect preparation for surprise attack

If an inspection system is designed primarily to assure each party that the other would not undertake a surprise atomic assault--if in other words the objective of the inspection system is to fortify the stability of a situation of mutual deterrence--the problems of setting up an adequate inspection system are greatly simplified. For example it might focus mainly on: observation of those airfields or other facilities which would have to be used in an atomic attack; observation of the movements of those aircraft, vessels or other means having delivery capabilities; and observation of the communication centers which would presumably be involved in the extensive non-nuclear preparations for such an assault.

b. Verification of cessation of production of nuclear fuels.

If the object of inspection is to verify that the major installations involved in the production of nuclear fuels had in fact ceased production the problem of inspection would be more difficult, but still relatively limited

limited. The major installations involved in the production of nuclear fuel are large-scale industrial activities and are relatively few in number. Clandestine operation of a supposedly closed plant would be relatively simple to detect (as compared for example to diversion from an operating facility). Detection of an unreported major installation would require more extensive inspection and access but would be facilitated by the size and complexity of such installations.

c. Verification of reports of stocks of major conventional weapons.

Inspection to verify reports of the amounts and types of major conventional weapons and carriers would involve inspection of great numbers of weapons in numerous localities. This would call for the establishment of a sizeable inspection corps with almost unlimited rights of access. But given the size and numbers of major conventional weapons, and the difficulties of undetected movement if a comprehensive inspection system was operating, it should be feasible, with sufficient effort, to determine numbers and types within tolerable limits.

d. Verification of reports of stockpiles of nuclear fuels.

Inspection of stockpiles of nuclear fuels would present the greatest of difficulties. It would not be possible to determine, within a substantial range of error

error, the amount of past nuclear output on the basis of analysis of the plants, their equipment and records, alone. Since no feasible technical method is now available for detecting fissionable or fusionable material which has been secretly stored, and since past accounts of production could be falsified, the problem of inspection would present the most acute difficulties.

C. Varying Importance of the Reliability of Inspection.

19. The degree of reliance upon the inspection system would vary at different stages of a disarmament program.

a. If the program had only progressed to a stage of guarding against surprise attack and neither party had reduced its military capabilities, a failure of inspection would not expose the U.S. to materially greater risks than those which existed before the scheme went into effect.

b. If the program involved a cessation of production of nuclear fuels, but no reduction of existing nuclear or other weapons, the U.S. would still retains its nuclear superiority. Any Soviet clandestine output would have to be carried on without detection for a substantial period before it would materially reduce U.S. quantitative superiority in nuclear fuels. Even then the U.S. would retain all of its present massive retaliatory capability and delivery systems.

c.

c. If the program had reached a stage of reducing nuclear stockpiles pro rata to a point which fully allowed for technical inability to account for all past Soviet production, the U.S. would still have nuclear superiority, even if the Soviets secreted to the full amount of the technical unaccountability (See page 23 below.)

d. If, under the program, the U.S. nuclear stockpiles were reduced below the total which the Soviets might retain legally or illegally (the technically unaccountable amount) the U.S. security would then depend upon the reliability of the inspection system, at least if the potential Soviet nuclear capability might be of major military value.

20. Growth, through experience, of inspection capabilities.

a. Any inspection system will gain in efficiency through experience in operation. The inspection corps will become more effective over time as it gains familiarity with the country and with the operating habits of the military and economic system, and as it continues to acquire data on installations and weapons to which it has access.

b. This will be of particular importance in relation to inspection of nuclear fuels. When the inspection agency first begins to function it will have to depend

to depend on analysis of plants, equipment and records alone, and will thus have to depend on data involving a possible major element of error. As the agency gains familiarity with the other aspects of the economy involved in nuclear production--power, mining, specially designed components, transportation facilities, etc., it will have a further check on the accuracy of its initial data. Opportunity to question the technicians, advisers, or managers involved in the nuclear program would give it a further check, over time, on the consistency of the data. The family of weapons reported would indicate certain proportions between the different components (plutonium and U-235) and would therefore throw some light on the probable planned output of those components.

c. Thus the agency, over time, would gradually come to a better basis for judging the correctness of the original data, and the parties would gain, over time, increasing grounds for a conviction as to whether or not the agreement was being honored.

D. Interrelation of nuclear and conventional disarmament

21. Differing situations according to level of nuclear disarmament.

a. At the stage where the program involves only inspection and stoppage of nuclear production, the US would

would still retain its existing nuclear capabilities. This stage clearly need not be conditioned on reduction of conventional weapons.

b. When the US ceases to have a nuclear advantage US security will depend on the balance of conventional forces. This will be true whether the nuclear balance results from a disarmament program or from the growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities. In either case, conventional weapons could be brought into balance either by buildup or by reductions under a disarmament scheme. Since the Soviets are expected to achieve effective atomic parity in any case, the fact that a disarmament plan would cancel out atomic weapons does not require that its adoption be conditioned on agreement to disarm in conventional weapons.

c. At the same time it will obviously be desirable to achieve conventional disarmament, both for its own sake and for the practical reasons indicated in the next paragraph.

22. Operational relationships of nuclear and conventional arms.

Several practical factors would operate in favor of a linkage of conventional and nuclear reductions regardless of the degree of nuclear reduction.

a. The control

a. The control of "conventional" systems for delivery would itself be a major safeguard against atomic capabilities. In particular, reduction or inspection of delivery capabilities would decrease the dangers involved in secreted nuclear stockpiles.

b. Inspection directed at nuclear activities would inevitably provide information on non-nuclear activities as well. Thus an information base would be laid for proceeding with an agreed conventional reduction program.

c. Including conventional armaments in the reduction program would greatly enhance the chances for detecting any Soviet activities and preparations aimed at violation of the agreement.

E. Possible Phasing of a Disarmament Program

23. In view of the interrelationship of the various elements discussed above, a phased program for disarmament might progress through the following stages:

a. Disclosure by the parties to the agreement of quantities and types of nuclear and conventional armaments and carrying out of inspection directed primarily toward verification of disclosure of nuclear weapons and nuclear facilities.

b. Cessation of production of nuclear fuels.

c. Proportionate reduction of nuclear stockpiles, including

including, however, adequate allowance for possible concealed and unreported stocks.

d. Further reductions of nuclear stockpiles.

The next part discusses the details of these phases, and the relation of conventional disarmament to each phase.

IV. Outline of a Plan

We now examine the progressive stages visualized in a plan based on the considerations that have been discussed above.

Stage I: Disclosure and Verification

A. Obligations Assumed by Signatories

In this stage, the signatories would be obligated to disclose their military strength both in the nuclear and conventional fields and to allow sufficient inspection to enable the Agency to verify these disclosures to the extent outlined below.

B. Purpose and Extent of Inspection

The purpose of inspection at this juncture would be: to 1) minimize the danger from surprise attack, 2) lay the groundwork for cessation of production at the next stage, and 3) build up a reporting record of overall military strength as a basis for reductions at a later stage. Inspection would

would be directed primarily at determining all elements of the nuclear production chain.

C. Value of this stage to the United States

In a period of atomic parity, the probable situation of mutual deterrence will at best be a precarious one. The free world would never be certain that the Soviet Union, banking on its inherently greater capability for surprise attack, would not decide to launch all-out nuclear warfare (a) in the hope of wiping out the free world's retaliatory power; or (b) in the mistaken belief that the free world was preparing a sudden attack on it.

The inspection envisaged in this stage, though limited, would provide the U.S. with insight into Soviet preparations, state of readiness, and some indication of intentions. If the Soviet Union were in fact making preparations for a surprise attack, these preparations would be so extensive both in the nuclear field and collaterally in the conventional field that the nuclear inspection system would in all probability discover them. Thus, the Soviets would be unable to achieve effective surprise and would have to forego such a strategy. Similarly, inspection of the U.S. would serve to alleviate Soviet suspicions that the U.S.

was

was preparing for sudden attack. The net effect of inspection at this stage, then, would be to reinforce the situation of mutual deterrence, a result which would clearly be in the U.S. interest.

F. Risks to the United States

Mutual inspection even at this stage would give the Soviet Union additional intelligence and increased opportunities for sabotage and subversion. It is unlikely, however, that the information obtained concerning nuclear armament would exceed materially what the Soviet Union has already secured through its intelligence operations. The information the U.S. obtained in the Soviet Union, on the other hand, would in all probability represent an important addition to its intelligence. The limited inspection contemplated at this stage need not extend to the more sensitive aspects of research and development, and manufacturing processes, where the Soviet Union would be expected to gain most.

The dangers of sabotage and subversion might be slightly increased, but it would appear that adequate safeguards could be erected against these dangers: (a) inspection teams would consist of several nationalities, (b) a team inspecting the U.S. could have not only Soviet members but American members

members as well, and (c) the internal security services of the country would be expected to strengthen their operations.

E. Relation of Conventional to Nuclear at This Stage

In order to lay the groundwork for subsequent verification and reductions in the conventional field, signatories should be required to report at this stage their over-all conventional strength.

Stage II: Cessation of Nuclear Production

A. Obligations Assumed by the Signatories

The signatories would be required: (a) to shut down all major elements in the nuclear materials production chain (mines, processing, production, and weapons fabrication facilities) and permit the Agency to supervise the process and to assign permanent resident inspectors at these facilities; (b) to permit the Agency to verify those elements of conventional armaments relating to delivery capability; and (c) to continue periodic reports of conventional forces and weapons.

B. Purpose and Scope of Inspection

Inspection at this stage would necessarily become more extensive. The inspectors would have to satisfy themselves that all major nuclear facilities had in

had in fact been located before the Agency ordered them shut-down. Permanent resident inspectors would be provided to ensure that facilities remained shut-down. The Agency would inspect delivery capabilities.

C. Value of this Stage to the United States

Since increases in nuclear stockpiles over the next few years will tend to increase the effective atomic strength of the USSR relative to that of the U.S., any arrangement for cessation of production of nuclear fuels would in itself be advantageous to the U.S. now or at any time in the near future. Since the present stockpiles of nuclear fields are adequate for peacetime power use for well over a decade, cessation of production would not impede development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Finally, stopping nuclear output would facilitate later reductions in nuclear materials by keeping down the inventories of past production.

D. Risks to the United States

The risks involved for the United States in agreeing to cessation of production of nuclear fuels would not be great. The United States would retain its stockpile of nuclear weapons and its delivery capabilities and would be in a position to resume production whenever it believed that the U.S.S.R. was

not abiding by an agreement. The U.S. would not be undertaking a material sacrifice of its ability to wage atomic war against the Soviet Union and thus of its deterrent to Soviet initiation of hostilities.

It is difficult to assess whether this step would give the Soviet Union a net intelligence advantage over the United States. The Soviet Union could probably glean some information on plants and processes which would be useful in event of subsequent breakdown of the plan, but how far such information might go beyond what the Soviets already have is uncertain. On the other hand, the United States might also glean information about plants and processes useful to its program in event of breakdown.

E. Relation of Conventional to Nuclear at this Stage

As we have seen, cessation of production in itself would be advantageous to the United States, without any parallel restriction on conventional armaments. However, in order to protect against surprise attack, the Agency should identify and inspect the facilities and means constituting delivery capabilities.

Stage III:

[redacted]

Stage III: Limited Reductions

A. Obligations to be Undertaken by the Parties

The two parties would undertake:

a) to reduce proportionately their nuclear weapon stockpiles to an agreed level. (In agreeing to this level the U.S. would take account of the initial margin of error judged to be inherent in accounting for past production of nuclear fuels so as to minimize any military advantage to the USSR in secretly withholding a portion of its production.*)

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*(1) Assume x = total Soviet stockpile
10x = total US stockpile

Now, if margin of error in accounting for past production = 20%, limitation scheme would have to assume Soviets had withheld .2x. If legally permitted accounts were set at .3x, the following ratios would obtain:

Hidden Soviet stocks	=	.2x
Legally Held Soviet stocks	=	.3x
Total Soviet		.5x

Legally Held US stocks = 30% of 10x = 3.0x

(or)

(2) Assume same values for x but margin of error set at ±0%, then

Hidden Soviet stocks	=	.4x
Legally held Soviet stocks	=	.3x
Total Soviet		.7x

Legally held US stocks = 30% of 10x = 3.0x

(continued on next page)

Stockpiles would be reduced to the initially agreed levels in successive annual installments to enable the parties to test continually whether the program was in fact being carried out as agreed and to minimize the danger of a violation. The nuclear fuels taken from

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(Continuation of footnote from page 23)

(3) Assume: x = Soviet stockpile
5x = US stockpile

a. if error factor is 20%, then
Total Soviet stocks = .5x
Legally held US stocks = 1.5x

b. if error factor is 40%, then
Total Soviet stocks = .7x
Legally held US stocks = 1.5x

Depending on which set or permutation of assumptions is correct, several factors would have to be balanced:

1. Would the destructiveness of Soviet 0.5x or 0.7x be so great that the limitation arrived at under the various assumptions would not be very meaningful? Even given US figures of 3x, or 1.5x?

2. What ratio of US to USSR nuclear superiority would be necessary to balance off USSR to US conventional superiority?

3. Are the destructiveness factor, the superiority factor, and the error factor, such that the legally held figure should be 30%, 20% or 40%?

The answer to 3. above would be largely determinative of the initially agreed level to which all armaments should be reduced.

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from weapons stocks would be turned over to the Agency for safekeeping and for promoting the ends envisaged in the President's December 8 U.N. proposal.*

(b) to make corresponding reduction in their delivery capabilities for nuclear weapons, thereby rendering less dangerous any secret and illegal atomic stocks; and

(c) to permit the Agency to verify the reporting of conventional weapons generally.

B. Scope of Inspection

Inspection would now become very extensive. The Agency would have rights of complete ingress, egress, and access in order to carry out its cumulative

*Conversion of nuclear fuels to a form unsuitable for weapon use but suitable for use in reactors presents certain problems. U-235 apparently can be so converted with relatively little difficulty. Plutonium, however, poses a more difficult problem. One solution might be to spoil plutonium so it was not suitable for either purpose but could be reprocessed at a later stage when (a) requirements for fissionable material for reactors increased, and (b) operation of the reduction plan, over time, had built up enough confidence to warrant running the risk inherent for using plutonium for reactors.

The amounts of material becoming available to the Agency would be so large that rigorous safeguards would have to be applied, including close supervision by the Agency of the design and operation of power reactors and provision that chemical reprocessing of reactor materials could be undertaken only in facilities under the managerial control of the Agency.

cumulative functions of verification, inspection, and supervision. In general, the provisions of the U.N. plan with respect to rights and limitations of access could be applied.* The Agency would also operate a few key facilities, e.g., chemical processing plants, when these were required for peaceful purposes.

C. The Value of this Stage to the United States

Presumably, the Soviet Union will not reach atomic plenty until 1957-1959. A pro rata reduction during this period would perpetuate U.S. nuclear superiority which should balance off Soviet conventional superiority If put into effect after 1959, the plan might reduce Soviet capabilities well below the level of atomic plenty with the U.S. still ahead in numbers by a wide margin.

D. Risks for the U.S.

The major risk to the U.S. lies in the possibility of violation. The violation would hardly take the form of seizure, or attempted seizure, of Agency-held materials, for this would surely bring in immediate nuclear strikes by the West against the Soviet Union. It would hardly take the form of failure to comply

* See Annex ____, Second Report of UN AEC, Sept. 11, 1947, Chapter 6: "Rights of and Limitations on the International Agency in Relation to Inspection, Surveys, and Explorations."

comply with the prescribed annual reduction for this also would be a clear warning to the West. A violation by secret withholding of nuclear materials has already been discounted in fixing the levels at this stage. For the West, general war in this context would surely be no worse, perhaps it would be less bad, than general war in a period of atomic plenty.

Upon discovery of any violation, the United States would immediately be free to take whatever punitive action it deemed necessary in its own interest. Similarly the Agency would probably detect any nuclear and conventional preparations for aggressive war in time for warning.

E. Relation of Conventional to Nuclear Reductions

Inasmuch as the Soviets will soon reach effective atomic parity with the U.S., despite our much larger total, proportionate reduction of U.S. and USSR nuclear stockpiles would appear to be advantageous to the U.S. in itself, whether or not accompanied by reduction of conventional forces.

At the same time, the control over nuclear materials would be reinforced by control over delivery capabilities.

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capabilities. Hence a strenuous effort should be made to obtain agreement on such control, but for the reasons stated above, it should not be made a condition of nuclear control.

Similarly, as approach to effective nuclear parity tends to create nuclear stalemate, or a control system has the same effect, the U.S. must adjust its forces to ensure its security under the new conditions. If a control of nuclear weapons is achieved, every effort should be made to obtain agreement on control of conventional arms and forces, to become effective not later than the end of Phase III. If such agreement is not obtained, the U.S. will have to modify its conventional forces to adjust to the new situation.

Stage IV: Further Reductions

Introduction

In the light of the experience under the preceding stages, the parties would have to decide whether to proceed with further reductions in the nuclear and conventional fields. It is now neither necessary nor feasible to anticipate this decision. It would turn in large part on whether the problem of accounting for past nuclear production can be solved so as to remove or neutralize the risk of secreted nuclear stockpiles. At that

At that time such a solution might be facilitated - (a) by the cumulative experience and data of the inspection agency; or (b) by the reinforcing of control of nuclear materials as a result of the controls over means of delivery and possibly other weapons; or (c) by a major change in political climate, which would allow creation of an international force capable of neutralizing any illegal retention of such weapons; or (d) the combination of several of these factors.

A. Obligations Assumed by the Signatories

To reduce further both conventional armaments and nuclear weapons to the extent that the margin of unaccountable nuclear materials had in fact been reduced or neutralized.

B. Scope of Inspection

The full rights of inspection, survey, and explanation as provided in the U.N. plan would be applied with whatever further safeguards such as additional managerial controls might be found at that time to be necessary.

C. The Value and Risks of this Stage to the U.S.

Major reductions in nuclear and conventional armaments which drastically reduced the ready war-making power of the Free World and the Communist bloc would restore

restore to the United States its traditional superiority in, and reliance on, its industrial mobilization potential. In these circumstances, the likelihood of effective military measures should be greatly reduced and the danger of nuclear annihilation lessened.

b. Stage IV: Equal and Ceiling

In this stage, the results thus far permitted further reduction of nuclear weapons would almost certainly enable major reductions in conventional armaments.

Stage V: Conclusions

1. The phased program outlined above would be in the interest of the U.S.:

(a) each phase of the program would in itself benefit the US; (b) the risks involved in each phase are considerably less than those involved in a continuation of present trends; (c) support of such a program by the US would remove the dangers involved to the US in continued support of the technically outmoded UN plan; (d) a phased program might increase the admittedly slight prospects of USSR agreement.

2. In negotiating such a program the US should proceed upon the following principles:

(a) it would be desirable to secure agreement at the outset to the first three phases of the program, but the US should be willing, if necessary, to begin with

with agreement on the first phase; (b) if not covered by earlier agreement negotiation of the next nuclear phase of the program should commence at least as early as the outset of the preceding phase; (c) it would be desirable to have conventional disarmament proceed in phase with the nuclear program, and negotiation of agreements with respect to conventional armament which the US believes should be controlled in the next phase should commence at least as early as the outset of the preceding phase. Agreements in the nuclear field should not be conditioned, however, on agreements with respect to conventional armaments.

Stage VI: Recommendations

It is recommended that the National Security Council:

1. Approve as US policy the general approach set forth in this study for a disarmament plan.

2. Direct the preparation of detailed proposals for a disarmament plan on the lines indicated for use in the international disarmament discussions.

STATE FD
WASHINGTON, D.C.

PHASING OF DISARMAMENT PROGRAM

Phase	Reporting	Inspection	Reduction	Negotiation*
I	Nuclear and conventional production, facilities, armaments and forces	Nuclear production facilities and weapons	None	Cessation of nuclear production
II	Continued periodic reports on above categories	Nuclear facilities and weapons; capabilities for delivery of nuclear weapons	Cessation of nuclear production	Initial reduction of nuclear stockpiles; reduction of capabilities for delivery of nuclear weapons
III	As above	Nuclear facilities and weapons; conventional production, armaments, and forces	Initial reduction of nuclear stockpiles; reduction of capabilities for delivery of nuclear weapons	Further reduction of nuclear stockpiles and delivery capabilities; reduction of conventional forces and armaments
IV	As above	As above	Further reduction of nuclear stockpiles and delivery capabilities; reduction of conventional forces and armaments	

*It would be preferable to negotiate initially an agreement on all the first three phases. If this does not appear feasible the negotiations described on the chart should be initiated at the outset of the Phase in which they are specified.

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